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We analyse the role of bargaining centralisation when both the union's outside option and union membership are 
endogenous and considered in a dynamic framework. A dynamic two-sector model is developed where the wage rate in 
the first sector is either set by a monopoly union or is the result of efficient bargaining between union and firm. The 
union's outside option is employment in the second, competitive sector. We extend the dynamic analysis by modelling 
the outside option as endogenous and show that dynamic models may also overstate employment distortions in this case 
if bargaining is conducted on a highly centralised stage. Additionally, we offer reflexions along the optimisation 
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 A Dynamic Model of Union Behaviour
1 Introduction
We analyse the role of bargaining centralisation when both the union’s outside option
and union membership are endogenous and considered in a dynamic framework. The
general result that conventional static models may overstate the labour market distor-
tions caused by unionism is known from the literature (Jones, 1987; Kidd and Oswald,
1987; Jones and McKenna, 1994; Chang and Lai, 1997; Chang, Lai and Chang, 1998).
But these kind of models have in common that a worker’s outside option is unem-
ployment beneﬁt which is exogenously given. Another branch of literature uses static
models with endogenous outside options. These often make the assumption of a sec-
ond sector that is competitive, with wages adjusting to clear the market (McDonald and
Solow, 1985). In the bargaining process, though, the wage in the competitive sector is
still taken as exogenous by ﬁrms and unions. However, this approach implies a large
number of relatively small unions and bargaining taking place at the ﬁrm level. Each
union then has a negligible impact on the competitive wage. Therefore, when each
union acts independently, it maximises only its own utility and ignores the effects on
other unions (Fuest and Thum, 2001; Beissinger and Egger, 2004). But this consid-
eration does not hold anymore in the case of centralised wage formation, i. e. when
there is only one large union in the economy.1 This union should take into account
that a higher wage in the unionised sector increases labour supply in the competitive
sector, partly consisting of union members. The seminal work by Calmfors and Drif-
ﬁll (1988) considers the impact of different degrees of wage setting centralisation in
a static framework. They postulate that both a very high and a very low degree lead
to lower wage and higher employment rates than intermediate institutional settings,
resulting in a hump-shaped relation between centralisation and real wages.
This paper aims to combine these different approaches and conduct a straightfor-
ward analysis concerning the employment consequences of various institutional wage
settings. In line with the dynamic union literature, we develop a two-sector model
where the wage rate in the ﬁrst sector is either set by a monopoly union or the result
of efﬁcient bargaining between union and ﬁrm. The union’s outside option is employ-
ment in the second, competitive sector. Dynamic models take into account at least
1Countries with rather centralised wage settings are particularly Austria, Norway and Denmark. Alter-
natively, instead of considering the whole economy, the scenario would also apply to a speciﬁc sector or
region within the economy which is – in terms of employment migration – rather secluded from other
parts. Then the possibility of centralised wage setting is also quite realistic.
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two important empirical facts: First, unions last for more than one period and bargain
repeatedly with ﬁrms. Second, union membership is changing over time, presum-
ably related to changes in the unemployment rate (Sanfey, 1995). Taking into account
these empirical ﬁndings concerning union membership, we model union dynamics in
a rather general setting. We further extend the dynamic analysis by modelling the out-
side option as endogenous, with potential impacts on employment and wages in both
sectors. As we show, there is a further bargaining centralisation impact on employ-
ment in addition to that discussed by Calmfors and Drifﬁll (1988). Two different cases
are distinguished to analyse the effect of centralisation: ﬁrst, decentralised bargaining
at the ﬁrm level and second, centralised bargaining between a large union covering
all workers and an employer’s federation covering all ﬁrms. Also the various cen-
tralisation degrees are analysed both in a monopoly union and an efﬁcient bargaining
framework, respectively.
We show that dynamic models may also overstate employment distortions if the
union’s outside option is determined endogenously. A large centralised union takes
into consideration that a higher union wage drives down both employment in the
unionised sector and the wage in the competitive sector. Then a higher degree of
centralisation leads to higher employment and lower wages in the unionised sector.2
Additionally, we offer reﬂexions along the optimisation process in different scenarios
and a comparative static analysis, thus presenting some new general insights into the
topic of union wage setting/bargaining and its effect on labour market outcomes.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces the model economy consist-
ing of ﬁrms, workers and unions. Sections 3 and 4 consider the cases of a monopoly
union and efﬁcient bargaining, respectively, each under decentralised as well as under
centralised wage setting. In Section 5, a comparative static analysis is conducted while
Section 6 concludes.
2Dittrich (2005) develops a similar static monopoly union model but he neglects dynamic bargaining and
membership effects.
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2 The Framework
2.1 Firms and Workers
We consider an economy which is divided into a unionised and a competitive labour
market. There are g identical ﬁrms and an equal number of unions in the unionised
sector, whereas the number of ﬁrms in the competitive sector is normalised to unity.
Workers who are not employed in the unionised sector always ﬁnd a job in the com-
petitive sector. Each individual supplies one unit of labour. Total available workforce
denoted by z consists of workers employed in the unionised and of workers in the
competitive sector. Let n denote employment in each of the g unionised ﬁrms and c
employment in the competitive sector. Then the workforce in the competitive sector
can be written as
ct = z¡gnt; (1)
implying the clearing of the labour market.
Production functions in both sectors are characterised by diminishing returns to
labour and obey the Inada conditions. The production function of a representative
ﬁrm in the unionised sector is given by f(nt), with t denoting time. The output price is
set to unity. Thus, a ﬁrm’s proﬁt in period t can be written as
pt = f(nt)¡wtnt; (2)
where wt denotes the union wage in t.
The production technology in the competitive sector is denoted by g(ct). Since
employment here is residual from that in the unionised sector, the wage bt will be
determined such that the marginal productivity condition holds:
bt = g0(ct): (3)
2.2 Unions
Our starting point in the consideration of union behaviour is the seminal dynamic for-
mulation in Jones (1987) and Kidd and Oswald (1987). We assume utilitarian unions
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that maximise the utility of their members. Since the unions’ bargaining behaviour
may result in some union members not being employed in the unionised sector but in
thecompetitiveone, thegeneralobjectivefunctionforeveryunioninanyoneparticular
period t depends on the level of wage and employment in both sectors:
vt = u(wt)nt +u(bt)[mt ¡nt]; (4)
where u(:) is the individual worker’s state-independent concave utility function and mt
denotes membership per union. We assume the union to care about both the utility of
current and future members. Thus, the intertemporal formulation of the union’s utility





where r denotes the rate of time preference. In the following, we assume time to be
continuous and suppress time indices for notational simplicity.
A crucial point in our approach is modelling union membership. We assume mem-
bership to depend on employment in the union sector. To be more speciﬁc, some union
workers who lose their jobs there will leave the union.3 This assumption originates
from the empirical evidence that changes in membership move with changes in unem-
ployment (Kidd and Oswald, 1987). But since there is empirical evidence that a still
signiﬁcant part of unemployed persons keep union members (Visser, 2006), we assume
that only a part of workers not employed in the union sector will leave the union. These
facts can be expressed by the differential equation






where ˙ mdenotesthechangeinunionmembershipovertime. Thefractionofworkersin
the competitive sector that remain union members is given by s 2(0;1). That is, union
membership arises from employment in the union sector plus a fraction s of workers
in the competitive sector. In other words, the share 1¡s of workers not employed in
the union sector will leave their union. Hence, we relax the restricting assumption in
3See Blackorby et al. (1995, 2002) for the use of relevant utility functions and an elaborate welfare
analysis if population size is changing over time.
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Kidd and Oswald (1987), where all unemployed are assumed to leave the union, and
use this more general formulation. We can shorten (6) as follows:




In the following, we differentiate in two dimensions between two respective basic sce-
narios of wage determination. One dimension is about the institutional procedure of
wage determination. In the ﬁrst case, the wage is set by a monopolistic union. For the
given wage, ﬁrms then unilaterally choose the number of workers they want to employ,
according to the marginal productivity condition
wt = f0(nt): (8)
Since there is one-to-one correspondence from employment n to the wage w given by
(8), w can be replaced by n as the union’s instrument of optimisation. As known from
the literature, however, the monopoly union model – and also the more general right-
to-manage approach – generate inefﬁcient outcomes (McDonald and Solow, 1981).
This inefﬁciency is due to the fact that solutions have to lie on the labour demand
curve. Thus, both parties will be better off if this restriction is abandoned and if there
is bargaining over both wage and employment. Implementing this fact would not be far
from reality since the outcome of union-ﬁrm bargaining may in practise not always be
a mere agreement about the wage but also about other variables. For instance, Svejnar
(1986) suggests that for many ﬁrms in the U.S. industry the outcome can be better
described by efﬁcient bargaining. Therefore, in the second case, we analyse the effects
of union centralisation in a dynamic efﬁcient bargain model.
The second dimension is the degree of union centralisation. We consider two ex-
tremecases: ontheonehandtotallydecentralisedwagedeterminationontheﬁrmlevel,
and on the other hand centralised wage determination for all the unionised sector.
In each case of these scenarios, the representative union has to solve an inﬁnite-
horizon dynamic optimisation problem, i.e. it maximises the discounted utility of its
members taking into account the membership dynamics and the speciﬁc institutional
conditions, respectively. Section 3 shows this for the monopoly union framework,
while the efﬁcient bargaining case is analysed in Section 4.
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3 The Monopoly Union
3.1 Decentralised Wage Setting
We ﬁrst consider the case where the wage is set by a monopolistic union in a decen-
tralisedstructure. Ifthewagerateisdeterminedattheﬁrmlevelandthereisarelatively
large number of ﬁrms, each individual union has a negligible inﬂuence on the compet-











where all variables are functions of time. Let l be the costate variable. Then the




















e¡rt +l[1¡s] = 0 (11)
¶H
¶m
= u(b)e¡rt ¡l = ¡˙ l: (12)
Equation (11) captures the change in union’s utility caused by a marginal variation in
n. For mathematical convenience, we deﬁne b(n) ´ u(w)+u0(w)f00(n)n. This term
represents that part of change arising from the unionised sector: First, the number of
employees varies marginally there, and this way also the number of individual utilities
taken into account, which is embodied in u(w). Second, due to changes in the num-
ber of employees, the wage reacts for all n of them, and hence also utility caused by
the wage, given by u0(w)f00(n)n. Additionally, employment also changes in the com-
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petitive sector and with it union’s utility issued there, too. In the current framework,
the union considers in particular variations in the number of union members employed
there, which mirrors that in the unionised sector. This is linked to a change in the num-
ber of individual utilities summed up and captured in the term ¡u(b). Finally, the last
term in (11) reﬂects the variation in the state variable m due to a marginal variation of
n, times the shadow price of m, i.e. the change in a union’s utility due to a marginal
variation of m, which is given by l. Equation (12), on the other hand, complementary
describes the development of this shadow price in reaction to a marginal change in m.
The l-term in (12) can now be eliminated using (11) and its derivative with respect
















The ﬁrst two terms in (14) have a negative sign, while the third term can be either
negative or positive, depending on f000(n). For our further analysis, we assume that
bn < 0.5 In the following, we focus on the characteristics of the long-run equilibrium.






together with (8). Note that the equivalent static solution without membership dynam-
ics is given by b(n) = u(b).6 The dynamic consideration complements this term by
the discount factor s+r
1+r. The reason for this factor to occur is simply the fact that
4A detailed derivation is given in the appendix.
5This holds either if f000(n) < 0 or if f000(n) > 0 but having a relatively small value, that is, if
2u0(w)f00(n)+u00(w)f00(n)2n < ¡u0(w)f000(n)n. The condition bn < 0 will be satisﬁed if f(n) is repre-
sented by a Cobb-Douglas production function, e. g. f(n) = n
1+e
e with e < ¡1 being the elasticity of
labour demand, or by any conventional kind of constant elasticity production function.
6See Booth (1995) for an analysis of union behaviour in a static framework.
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current decisions about n inﬂuence the future stock of union members, represented
by s. Lower employment in the unionised sector drives down future membership,
with corresponding consequences for the sum of utility the union strives to maximise.
However, future utility is valued less than the current one, which is captured by the
time preference rate r. The discount factor assesses this effect on union’s utility due to
membership dynamics and incorporates it into the condition of optimal behaviour.
Since s 2(0;1) and b is decreasing in n as explained above, it is easy to see that em-
ployment distortions caused by unions are lower if union membership is endogenous in
a dynamic consideration. Balancing both effects of a decrease in n – a present gain by
higher wages and a future loss in the number of members – ends up in higher employ-
ment and lower wages in the unionised sector compared to the static case. However, in
our more general framework, employment is not as high as Kidd and Oswald (1987)
predict, since there is still a fraction of workers in the competitive sector that remain
union members.
3.2 Centralised Wage Setting
The above ﬁndings are only valid if the wage setting is decentralised at the ﬁrm level
and if there is a sufﬁciently large number of ﬁrms. Then, every union can neglect the
consequences of its wage setting behaviour on the aggregate wage and employment.
However, this assumption cannot be maintained if the wage setting is centralised. In
this section, the case of a large union covering all workers is analysed. Now the union
has to take into account the wage effect in the competitive sector when it determines
the wage in the unionised sector. The idea is straightforward: a higher wage in the
unionised sector leads to lower employment there and therefore to higher employment
and a lower wage in the competitive sector. Since the union sets a mark-up on the
competitive wage, which is implicitly given by (15), a lower competitive wage reduces
the union wage.
The dynamic optimisation problem is now also subject to the restriction b = g0(z¡
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e¡rt +l[1¡s] = 0 (17)
gu(b)e¡rt ¡l = ¡˙ l: (18)
As before, b(n) represents the instantaneous utility change from a unionised ﬁrm
caused by a marginal variation in employment. Furthermore, we deﬁne a(n) ´ u(b)+
gu0(b) g00(z¡gn)[m¡n] as its competitive sector counterpart. In contrast to (11), not
only the variation in the number of employees is now taken into consideration but also
the change in the competitive wage and its consequences for the union’s utility.
Now we use (17) and its derivative with respect to time together with (18) to elimi-











There is a strong similarity to (13), adjusted to the current framework: as the union also
takes into consideration the wage consequences in the competitive sector of a variation
in n, the effect on union’s utility arising from there is captured by the more complex
a(n) instead of u(b).





must hold. Because also ˙ m=0 applies there, it follows from (7) that m¡n= s
g [z¡gn].





with f(n) = u0(b)g00(c)s[z¡gn] < 0. As before, employment is higher than a static
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monopoly union model would predict (Dittrich, 2005). There, employment is implic-
itly given by b(n) = u(b)+f(n). But moreover, with f(n) < 0, (21) implies a higher
employment level in the unionised sector compared to the result under decentralised
wage setting, which is given by (15). Hence, usual dynamic models with exogenous
outside option or with unions being too small to have signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the out-
side option overstate the labour market distortions caused by unions in the case of
centralised wage setting.
4 E￿cient Bargaining over Wages and
Employment
4.1 Decentralised Bargaining
In an efﬁcient bargaining framework where wage and employment are bargained over
separately, we ﬁrst consider bargaining at the ﬁrm level. Each single union disregards
the outside option consequences of the bargaining outcome. Since there is bargaining
over both wage and employment, the solution is not restricted to the marginal produc-
tivity condition (8). Instead, the ﬁrm seeks to realise some minimum level of proﬁt ¯ P
over its (inﬁnite) planning horizon. According to Kidd and Oswald (1987), we express









[f(n)¡wn]e¡rt dt ¸ ¯ P




The corresponding Hamiltonian is given by
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with m being a multiplier that does not depend on time. Hence, we end up with the







+l[1¡s]ert = 0 (24)
¶H
¶w
= u0(w)¡m = 0 (25)
¶H
¶m
= u(b)e¡rt ¡l = ¡˙ l: (26)
The optimal wage, being constant overtime, is implicitly givenby (25). Differentiating
(24) with respect to time and combining with (24), (25) and (26) yields an equation











with d(n) ´ u(w)+u0(w)[f0(n)¡w] denoting the efﬁcient bargaining counterpart to





which is in congruence with (15). Condition (28) is equivalent to the so-called con-
tract curve known from the union bargaining literature and determines the efﬁcient
bargaining outcome together with the rent division curve. The latter is a weighted av-
erage of the marginal and the average product of labour and deﬁnes the explicit wage-
employment combination on the contract curve depending on the bargaining strengths
of both parties (Booth, 1995). In our model, it is implicitly given by combining (28)
and
R ¥
0 [f(n)¡wn]e¡rt dt ¸ ¯ P.
Since the equivalent static solution is given by d(n)=u(b), it is easy to see that em-
ployment is higher if the union optimises an intertemporal utility function taking into
account membership dynamics, i.e. the fact that lower employment in the unionised
sector drives down future membership.
12A Dynamic Model of Union Behaviour
4.2 Centralised Bargaining
In a last step, we analyse bargaining over wage and employment between a large
union covering all workers and an employer’s federation covering all ﬁrms. As in
the monopoly union case, the union takes into account that the outside option depends
on employment in the unionised sector. Therefore, the dynamic optimisation problem
(22) is additionally subject to b = g0(z¡gn) and the bargaining covers all g ﬁrms.





+l[1¡s]ert = 0 (29)
u0(w)¡m = 0 (30)
gu(b)e¡rt ¡l = ¡˙ l: (31)
Solving in an analogous manner as before yields the optimal time path of employment











which again is equivalent to the monopoly union framework, given in (19). Finally, we
obtain the long-run equilibrium using the steady-state condition ˙ n = 0 and, from (7)
with ˙ m = 0, m¡n = s





The union takes into account that lower employment in the unionised sector will drive
down the outside option in the competitive sector. Therefore, since f(n) < 0, employ-
ment is higher under centralised bargaining than in the decentralised case (28). The
degree of wage bargaining hence is crucial in the analysis of labour market outcomes.
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5 Comparative Statics
The steady-state equilibrium conditions of the model in the two analysed institutional
frameworks, both under decentralised and centralised wage setting are assembled in
table 1.
Decentralised Centralised
Monopoly union b(n) = s+r
1+ru(b) b(n) = s+r
1+ru(b)+f(n)
Efﬁcient bargaining d(n) = s+r
1+ru(b) d(n) = s+r
1+ru(b)+f(n)
Table 1: Steady-state equilibria in the monopoly union and efﬁcient bargaining model.
We are now interested in how the labour market outcomes in the steady state respond
to changes in the exogenous parameters. Therefore, we differentiate the steady state
equilibria given in table 1.
Monopoly Union
To derive the comparative statics results of decentralised wage setting in the monopoly
union model, we ﬁrst totally differentiate (15) recalling (3) and (8). The changes in em-

































with r ´ s+r
1+rgu0(b)g00(c) < 0. Since there is a negative correlation between labour
demand and the wage, it can be veriﬁed from (14) that bw = f00¡1(w)bn > 0. Hence,
the derivatives of w with respect to the exogenous parameters have the opposite signs
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as the respective derivatives of n and are given by dn
di = f00¡1(w) dw
di , with i = g;s;r.
Furthermore, it can be obtained from (1) and (14) that bc = ¡
bn
g > 0, bz =
bn
g < 0 and
bg = c¡z
g2 bn > 0. Employment effects in the competitive sector caused by changes in






























The reaction of b regarding changes in the exogenous parameters have the opposite
signs, respectively, since there is a negative correlation between wage and employment
given by (3). The partial derivatives of b are given by db
di = gg00(c) dc
di, with i = g;s;r.
Similarly, the results of comparative statics in the case of a centralised wage setting
can be obtained. Therefore, we need the derivatives of f with respect to the endoge-






which is satisﬁed if g(c) is a conventional production function with constant elasticity.
Then the term in square brackets has a positive sign since u0(b)g00(c)+u00(b)g00(c)2c>
¡u0(b)g000(c)c. Furthermore, using (1), it can be checked that fc = fz = ¡
fn
g > 0 and
fg = n
gfn < 0.



































The signs may not be obvious at ﬁrst view, but they can easily be pointed out if we
consider the term r ¡fn. Using (34) and reformulating yields









As s 2 (0;1) and thus s+r
s(1+r) > 1, the term in square brackets has a negative sign.
Hence, it can be veriﬁed that dn
dz < 0 under both decentralised and centralised wage




bn+r, we can state that dn
dz is lower under centralised than under decen-
tralised wage setting. The opposite result is obtained for dn
dg, i. e. the effect is less
negative there. Furthermore, the impact of an increase in the rate of time preference r
has a stronger negative impact in the centralised setting while the effect of an increase
in s is ambiguous there.





































bn+r > 0. Hence, the employment effect in the competitive sector of a population
increase is indeed positive in both settings but is higher if wage setting takes place
centrally.
These effects can easily be shown in a similar way for the wages in both sectors. In
general, the comparative statics results do not vary qualitatively between decentralised
and centralised wage setting, i.e. the signs remain the same. The only exceptions are
changes in the endogenous variables with respect to s where the signs are ambiguous
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under centralised wage setting.
E￿cient Bargaining
We now analyse the efﬁcient bargaining equilibrium with decentralised wage setting.
Therefor, we have to calculate the derivatives of d with respect to the endogenous







where the sign is negative if dw
dn < 0. This condition holds because of the concavity of
































It can be checked that the comparative statics do not vary qualitatively between the
monopoly union and the efﬁcient bargaining model but only quantitatively since bn 6=
dn. The same effects can be shown for all other variables in both institutional settings.
Results
The comparative statics results obtained for the monopoly union and the efﬁcient bar-
gaining model are outlined in table 2 and can be interpreted as follows. A population
increase, i.e. an increase of the available workforce z, always has a positive impact on
both employment in the unionised and the competitive sector. These effects point in
the same direction under both wage setting frameworks but they vary quantitatively.
That is, a population increase leads to even more employment in the unionised sector
while there is a less positive impact on employment in the competitive sector if the
wage setting is decentralised, respectively. This is due to the fact that employment is
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z g s r
n ++ + ¡¡ ¡ ¡ ? ¡ ¡¡
w ¡¡ ¡ ++ + + ? ++ +
c + ++ ¡ ¡¡ + ? + ++
b ¡ ¡¡ + ++ ¡ ? ¡ ¡¡
Table 2: Comparative statics of stationary equilibria in the monopoly union and the efﬁcient
bargaining model. The ﬁrst sign in each cell indicates the effect in the decentralised setting
while the second one points out the centralised case. Double signs indicate a stronger impact,
respectively.
already higher under centralised wage setting. Hence, the marginal employment effect
is less signiﬁcant there.
The converse results are obtained for wages. A population increase lowers wages
in both sectors whereas this effect is more negative in the unionised sector and less
negative in the competitive one under decentralised wage setting, respectively.
The discount factor r measures the devaluation of future utility compared to instant
utility. The higher r the less the appreciation of future gains. Consequently, a rise in r
will raise the wage in the unionised sector, which is equivalent to a decrease in n. The
negative effects of this instant utility gain, resulting from the exit of union members
not employed there, will only take place in the future and is therefore valued less in the
present.
Somewhat surprising is the indeﬁniteness of a change in s in the centralised case.
For a small union a rise in this parameter is only synonymous to less future exits of
union members in reaction to insufﬁcient employment in the union sector. Hence po-
tentially employment in the union sector falls at rising wages there while the opposite
holds in the competitive sector; see the ﬁrst signs in the respective column of Table 2.
A large centralised union, on the other hand, additionally takes into consideration that
high wages in the unionised sector drive down wages in the competitive one. The more
workers keep union members, the stronger is the utility shrinking effect the union ex-
periences from higher union wages. Because it is not a priori clear which of these two
opposing effects is the dominant one, there is no clear statement about the qualitative
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effects from a change in s in the centralised case.
6 Concluding Remarks
The paper provides some new insights in the discussion on labour market distortions
caused by unionism. Two important propositions can be derived from the model: First,
equilibrium employment in all four cases is higher than static models predict. The
interpretation is straightforward: As the union maximises the utility of both current and
future members, it is partially interested in an employment increase. Under dynamic
consideration the union has to take into account the fact that some of the workers
not employed in the unionised sector but in the competitive one will leave the union.
This fact drives down the wage and increases employment in the unionised sector,
respectively. These results repeat the ﬁndings of the seminal works of Jones (1987)
and Kidd and Oswald (1987) in a more general setting of union dynamics.
Second, we have shown that the degree of bargaining centralisation plays an impor-
tant role in dual labour markets. Employment is higher under centralised bargaining
compared to the situation with decentralised bargaining at the ﬁrm level. A large cen-
tralised union will consider the consequences of its behaviour on the outcome in the
competitive sector. A union acting in a decentralised manner will not take into ac-
count these effects and will thus set a higher wage. Ceteris paribus, employment in the
unionised sector is higher under centralised bargaining. Standard models with exoge-
nous outside option or ignorant unions can not capture these differences. These results
are in line with the idea of Olson (1982). He argues that organised interest groups
are more harmful when they are strong enough to have signiﬁcant inﬂuence and cause
disruptions but not extensive enough to bear the costs of their actions. There is, how-
ever, no clue of a hump-shaped relationship between centralisation and the wage in
our analysis. In contrast to the work of Calmfors and Drifﬁll (1988), the impact we
consider just operates one-way, causing higher employment with higher centralisation.
Future research could combine their static framework with our dynamic analysis to
ﬁnd the total effects of bargaining centralisation on wage and employment. Of course,
the wage and employment effects of an endogenous outside option are not the only
crucial factors – but otherwise they may not be disregarded in the discussion on the
degree of bargaining centralisation.
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Appendix: Optimal Employment Paths
Monopoly Union
To derive the optimal employment time path under decentralised wage setting (13), we





l = u(b)e¡rt + ˙ l (A.2)













which can be used together with (A.3) to eliminate ˙ l and to get the optimal employ-
ment path (13).
The solution under centralised wage setting can be derived in an analogous manner.





l = gu(b)e¡rt + ˙ l (A.6)
while equating yields an equation in ˙ l:







Differentiating (A.5) with respect to time yields
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while combining (A.7) with (A.8) and solving for ˙ n gives the optimal employment path
(19).
E￿cient Bargaining
To derive the dynamic efﬁcient bargaining solution, we rearrange the ﬁrst-order con-































Simplifying and solving for ˙ n yields the optimal employment path (27).
In a similar way, the labour market outcome under centralised bargaining can be





which can be combined with (31) such that we get an equation in ˙ l:
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By differentiating (A.13) with respect to time, we end up with




Equating (A.14) with (A.15) and solving for ˙ n gives the optimal time path of employ-
ment (32).
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